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ABSTRACT
Smart grid is an intelligent cyber physical system (CPS). The CPS generates a massive amount of data for efficient grid
operation. In this paper, a big data-driven, cloud-based information and communication technology (ICT) framework
for smart grid CPS is proposed. The proposed ICT framework deploys hybrid cloud servers to enhance scalability and
reliability of smart grid communication infrastructure. Because the data in the ICT framework contains much privacy of
customers and important data for automated controlling, the security of data transmission must be ensured. In order to
secure the communications over the Internet in the system, identity-based schemes are proposed especially because of
their advantage in key management. Specifically, an identity-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme is proposed to provide
confidentiality, non-repudiation, and data integrity. For practical purposes, an identity-based signature scheme is relaxed
from the proposed IBSC to provide non-repudiation only. Moreover, identity-based schemes are also proposed to achieve
signature delegation within the ICT framework. Security of the proposed IBSC scheme is rigorously analyzed in this work.
Efficiency of the proposed IBSC scheme is demonstrated with an implementation using modified Weil pairing over an
elliptic curve. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is a major evolution of the power grid. Modern
control with information and communication technology
(ICT) is vastly applied in smart grid. With the advanced
ICT infrastructure, two-way communications between customers and service providers is achieved [1–4]. Therefore, smart grid is an advanced cyber physical system
(CPS). The CPS generates various types of data by smart
meters and different sensors. Because of the massive scale
of deployment and real-time (or near real-time) monitoring/controlling requirements, communications in smart
grid carry a huge amount of data.
In this paper, we propose an ICT framework for smart
grid to cope with big data generated in the CPS. By processing the big data (especially the metering data), smart
grid is to achieve efficient and effective demand-response
(DR) system [5–7]. DR system is one of the most important
components in smart grid. It smooths the power load of the
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grid so that waste can be reduced in those fossil fuel-based
power stations while renewable power sources can be integrated more efficiently. To achieve DR, energy forecast is
needed for utility companies to plan power generation and
price forecast is needed for customers to manage power
usage. In order to achieve high precision, large amount of
data is needed and refreshed frequently. Obviously, current control centers provided by utility companies have
limited computing capabilities that cannot fulfill the tasks
in general. Therefore, in the proposed ICT framework,
big data analytics and cloud computing are introduced to
assist the utility company. Because of the large scale of
smart grid, hybrid cloud service is proposed in the ICT
framework. Private local cloud servers are established and
maintained by utility companies in a distributed fashion.
Smart grid operations rely on the massive amount of data
and information are exchanged within the ICT framework.
Data collection and information sharing in smart grid
has many security concerns. For instance, metering data
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from the customers may contain privacy of individuals
[8–10]. Inaccurate control data from service providers may
cause extra loss in the power grid, or even a blackout. As a
result, metering data is usually transmitted through private
networks in smart grid. Monitoring networks for power
transmission lines are also private networks [11]. In this
case, utility companies shall have more control over the
collected data and communication networks. Actions may
be taken quickly if abnormal situations occur. However,
with the introduction of cloud computing, some data must
be transmitted through public networks (e.g., the Internet)
[12–14]. Although public cloud service providers have certain security mechanisms within the cloud, data exchange
over the Internet still needs extra protection, because a utility company would still mandate to have entire control
of the networks within its service area. It is inefficient if
not impossible to implement traditional cryptographic systems, symmetric or public, while providing full security
control over the data transmission for the utility companies. Identity-based (ID-based) security schemes [15–17]
fit here mainly for three reasons: (i) ID-based security
schemes utilize the identities of participants to generate
public keys so that public key distribution is simplified;
(ii) keys and other secret parameters can be updated easily
to accommodate status change of participants; and (iii) an
authentication center is required to control domain parameters as well as domain secrets. By adopting ID-based
security schemes, a utility company shall be in charge of
the network security efficiently even if the transmissions
are carried over the Internet, which is the case in the proposed ICT framework. Therefore, an ID-based security
scheme is proposed in this work to enhance the security of
the ICT framework.
The core of the proposed security solution is an IDbased signcryption (IBSC) scheme, which performs the
functions of both digital signature and encryption simultaneously. The proposed IBSC scheme utilizes public key
cryptography where the public key is computed mainly
based on the ID of each participant together with an expiration indicator time. As a result, public keys and related
domain secrets can be refreshed easily after each session.
Furthermore, public keys can be computed locally by any
legitimate user in the domain. Therefore, key management
is simplified to fit the ICT framework. The proposed IBSC
scheme performs efficiently with carefully chosen bilinear pairing operation and other system parameters. Despite
its simplicity, the proposed IBSC scheme provides confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation. The IBSC
scheme can be reduced to an ID-based digital signature
for those cases that do not require confidentiality. In order
to enhance the performance, the proposed IBSC is also
modified for session key distribution instead of direct message encryption. In addition, the identity-based schemes
are also applied to achieve signing right delegation. With
this feature, a control center is able to hand its data control to another (or a few other) control center temporarily
in the situations of routine maintenance, system failure,
and others.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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In summary, the main contributions in this work are as
follows:
 A big data-driven and cloud-based ICT framework is
proposed for smart grid CPS.
 An identity-based signcryption scheme is proposed
to secure data transmissions in the proposed ICT
framework.
 Signing right delegation from one control center to
another (or a few) control center is achieved by
identity-based schemes.
 Rigorous security analysis is presented for the proposed IBSC scheme.
 Performance of the proposed IBSC scheme is evaluated with numerical results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, related work is discussed. In Section 3, the
proposed ICT framework is presented. In Section 4, the
proposed identity-based security scheme is illustrated. In
Section 5, security of the proposed schemes is analyzed. In
Section 6, performance evaluation of the proposed scheme
is presented. In Section 7, conclusion and future work are
presented.

2. RELATED WORK
Security in smart grid CPS has been widely studied, especially in the area of private networks [1,3,18]. Many of
the existing work focused on the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) because of its importance to DR in smart
grid. Metering data collected in the AMI is undoubtedly
large in volume and refreshes frequently [1]. With more
deployment of renewable energy sources, a large variety of data will be introduced to smart grid additionally.
For example, ambient environmental status, energy storage unit status, and weather forecast. Therefore, big data
analytics is expected to take action in smart grid [19,20].
Cloud computing has been introduced to smart grid so
that big data analytics can take place [10,14,19]. Compared with the frameworks proposed in [10,19], the ICT
framework proposed in this work is more comprehensive.
There are private networks set by a utility company, a
hybrid cloud-based control center with sensitive data collected and pre-processed at local control centers (LCCs)
and a visionary idea of harvesting data from various public
sources. In addition, this work focuses on providing secure
communications for the ICT framework.
The authors in [10] studied a similar framework with
security focus. Our work is distinguished in quite a few
aspects. First, our proposed security scheme provides
encryption and digital signature simultaneously that make
it a simpler solution. Second, our proposed scheme has a
mechanism to automatically refresh domain secrets (i.e.,
public keys and other domain public parameters) so that
secrets can be easily revoked when a participant leaves the
system. Third, more applications such as signing delegation is considered in this work.
5263
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Identity-based cryptographic schemes have been widely
studied [10,15–17] recently. Unlike well-known symmetric cryptographic schemes (e.g., advanced encryption
scheme), ID-based cryptographic schemes are relatively
inefficient. Thus, they need to be redesigned or modified
for different applications in the proposed ICT framework based on specific requirements. For instance, some
data in our framework requires both confidentiality and
non-repudiation while the computation needs to be efficient, some data requires non-repudiation only, the domain
secrets need to be refreshed frequently, and others.

3. INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
FRAMEWORK FOR SMART GRID
3.1. Overview of the information and
communication technology framework
Figure 1 depicts an overview of the proposed ICT framework. Three types of networks are applied in this framework, including local area networks (LANs) established by
customers, private networks established by utility companies (or service providers), and the Internet provided by a
third-party Internet service provider. The combination of
the aforementioned networks establish two-way communications between utility companies and customers. There
are four parties in the framework, namely, internal data
collectors (i.e., customers and grid monitoring sensors), a
service provider, power generators, and external informa-
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tion sources. The first three parties are directly related to
smart grid. External information sources do not belong to
smart grid, nonetheless they provide insightful information
to smart grid operations.
3.2. Networks in the information and
communication technology framework
Communications in the ICT framework are achieved
through both private networks deployed by utility companies and the Internet. Specifically, internal data is gathered
and transmitted to utility companies through private networks. For example, metering data is uploaded through the
AMI. The wide area monitoring system for phasor measurement unit (PMU) data consists of private networks.
Monitoring networks for power transmission lines are also
private networks [11].
Security is one important reason for deploying private
networks. For instance, metering data is gathered from
customers; thus, it contains much private and sensitive
information of customers. Life style of a customer may be
revealed if metering data is leaked. In the AMI, a home
area network is established within a household, connecting
a smart meter and smart appliances with sensors and actuators. Each smart meter uploads data to a data aggregate
unit. data aggregate units in a neighborhood form a neighborhood area network. Metering data finally reaches the
metering data management system through a high speed
backhaul wide area network.
Reliability is another important issue. For instance, realtime monitoring in smart grid requires low latency (e.g.,

Figure 1. An overview of the proposed information and communication technology (ICT) framework.
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10 to 100 ms for PMUs in wide area monitoring system).
Public cellular networks or the Internet service providers
can hardly achieve the latency requirement because of their
complicated protocols and mechanisms. The private networks in smart grid are designed specifically to fulfill the
latency requirement.
Cost is also a major reason for private networks. Subscription fees for public network service providers can be
overwhelmingly high in the long run. Moreover, power
grid may cover larger areas than what a public network service covers. For instance, power transmission
line monitoring networks may cover remote areas that
have no public network access. The private networks are
built on different types of communication technologies,
including various types of wireless networks (e.g., WiFi, Zigbee, and WiMAX) and high speed wired networks
(e.g., optical fiber and Ethernet). Specific technologies
are chosen to balance optimal network performance with
hardware/maintenance cost.
3.3. Internal data collectors
Internal data is collected by sensors deployed in the power
grid. Specifically, smart meters are deployed at the customer side by utility companies. Many types of sensors
are deployed by utility companies to monitor transmission lines, substations, and others. In smart grid, customers
are motivated to actively participate in DR. Therefore,
some of the information is given to customers while being
uploaded to utility companies. For instance, customers
are granted access to electricity usage data of their own
properties. In many cases, customers have self-established
LANs or wireless LANs (WLANs), for example, Wi-Fi
and bluetooth, which connect smart devices, smart appliances, and corresponding smart meters in each household.
Smart devices can be smart phones, tablets, laptops, and
so on. Without loss of generality, smart phones will be
used for the indication of smart devices. From smart
phones, customers are able to monitor electricity consumption of their appliances. With network access, customers
have remote control capability over their appliances. In
many cases, LANs/WLANs established by customers have
access to the Internet. Consequently, remote monitoring
and remote control can be applied by customers anywhere
with Internet access. Apart from fixed household appliances, electrical vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid EVs
are mobile appliances that have more resilient electricity requirements. For example, an EV can be charged in
a household, it can also be charged in a public charging
station or a capable parking lot. Furthermore, some companies and researchers are pushing to standardize batteries
for EVs. In that case, customers can go to battery exchange
station and replace an empty battery with a fully charged
one. The electricity consumption of EVs at charging ports
will be captured by smart meters. Other useful information such as location and possible routes of EVs may be
gathered by some external agents with permission of the
customers. Such data will be considered as external data to
the ICT framework.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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3.4. Control centers and power generators
Control centers are deployed and operated by utility companies. Specifically, there are three types of control centers
in the proposed framework, LCCs, a cloud control center
(CCC), and an authentication server (AS) with a private
key generator (PKG). For simplicity, AS or PKG will be
used interchangeably indicating the group hereafter. It is
also reasonable to assume that PKG is a trusted third
party. In terms of responsibility, control centers as a whole
unit makes energy forecast to power generators and makes
price forecast to customers. In demand response, a control
center is also responsible of direct load control over both
power consumption from customers and electricity generation from power generators. Direct load control usually
apply to power companies themselves. For instance, they
cycle air conditioners(ACs) and water heaters on and
off during periods of peak demand to smooth the power
generation.
Undoubtedly, the power grid has a large scale. Therefore, LCCs need to be distributed across the power grid for
better scalability and reliability in the proposed ICT framework. For instance, an LCC can be deployed close to or
inside a power distribution substation. While each substation covers a relatively small area, an LCC is responsible
for the customers within that particular area. Substations
are currently connected by a high-speed private backhaul
network deployed by the utility company. With extra gateways to the backhaul network, LCCs are interconnected
reliably. Although LCCs and private networks are controlled by utility companies, it is safer to assume that LCCs
do not share collected data during normal operations. Some
necessary conditions for a LCC to share or pass data
to other LCCs include routine maintenance, temporary
system off-line because of cyber attacks or natural disasters. Main functions of LCCs include (i) internal data
(i.e., metering data and sensor data) collection, (ii) preprocessing for sensitive data so that privacy of customers
is protected, (iii) real-time direct control of the power grid
when needed, (iv) finalizing energy forecast for power
generators, and (v) generating price forecast for customers.
Different from LCCs, a CCC is a comprehensive unit
comprised with complicated and distributed hardware as
well as software. Different levels of services such as infrastructure as a service, platform as a service, and software as
a service can be provided. Nonetheless, such complexity
needs to be transparent to customers (i.e., the utility company). Therefore, the CCC is viewed as a powerful single
unit in the framework. The CCC is provided by a public
cloud service provider. It is connected internally by high
speed networks that are not controlled by the utility company. For instance, the Internet and private networks of
cloud service providers. Main functions of CCC include (i)
store data uploaded from the LCCs for a certain period, (ii)
fetch data from external sources, and (iii) perform big data
analytics to collected data and make raw energy forecast
for each area and the entire grid. Raw energy forecast is
sent back to LCCs for finalizing.
Power generators consist of conventional energy
sources and renewable energy sources. On one hand, if
energy forecast is provided for a sufficient time period,
5265
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conventional power generators are able to optimally control fuel consumption. Transition between peak and offpeak electricity generations can be more efficiently. On the
other hand, renewable energy sources appear to be less
profitable from energy forecast because of uncontrollable
sources. However, some kind of renewable resources are
predictable. For example, solar power is predictable with
accurate weather forecast. Therefore, in order to control
power generation optimally, estimated capacity of electricity generation from renewable resources is fed back to the
service provider. A better energy forecast for conventional
power generators can be made after receiving that information. Energy forecast in different granularity shall be
updated based on the latest collected data and the results
from data analysis.
3.5. External data sources
From the discussion earlier, we can see that, internal data
alone is not enough to make accurate energy forecast for
conventional power generators and energy storage units.
Different types of data from external sources are included
in the ICT framework. As mentioned earlier, for instance,
weather forecast can provide better estimation of electricity generation from renewable energy sources. Locations
and routes of EVs can be used to estimate energy consumption as well as the schedule. Useful information can
also be extracted in many other external sources. Smart
grid will certainly operate more efficiently with all those
external data.
3.6. Big data and cloud computing in
smart grid
Forecasting function of the ICT in smart grid is depicted
in Figure 2. It includes data input, big data analytics, and
information output. Input data of the ICT infrastructure
consists of internal data generated from smart grid and
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external data from other sources. Internal data is generated from the infrastructures in smart grid. For example,
metering data is generated frequently (e.g., every 15 min)
by smart meters deployed in AMI. Metering data reveals
the electricity usage of the power grid. It is important
for the service provider to adjust electricity generations
from the power generators. Besides metering data, the
monitoring and control system in smart grid also generates various monitoring data from different sensors, such
as PMUs and transmission line monitoring sensors. Sensing data that reveals the operational status of the power grid
is generated in real time (e.g., PMU generates data at high
frequency, for example, 60 to 120 frames per second for
60-Hz system [21]). It is important for the service provider
to be aware of any abnormal situation in the power grid
in real time. Therefore, actions can be taken to prevent a
blackout or to quickly recover from a blackout. With internal data, the service provider is able to monitor the power
grid and take actions if necessary.
External data from other sources is also an important
input for the ICT infrastructure. For example, the electricity to be generated from conventional power generators
depends not only on energy requirements from customers
but also from the capacity of renewable sources and storage
units. The capacity of renewable sources (e.g., a solar farm)
is not likely controllable. Nonetheless a precise weather
forecast will be helpful for the predication of that capacity.
There are various types and sources of external data. For
example, it can be weather forecast, data from social networks, data from location-based tracking applications of
smart devices, and many others.
The collected data assists the service provider to optimize the control over the power grid, such as giving energy
forecast in different granularity (e.g., daily, hourly, and per
minute) to power generators and price forecast in different granularity to customers and smart appliances. In order
to achieve the optimal control, the service provider needs
to perform big data analytics in four steps, data collection,
data pre-processing, data storage, and data analysis [22].

Figure 2. Data processing procedure.
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For instance, the service provider models the energy consumption of customers, and more importantly, the schedule of their appliances. The energy consumption of each
appliance may depend on its load, for example, an air
conditioner uses more electricity if lower temperature is
set. However, the fluctuation of power is not too much
for many appliances (e.g., washing machine and coffee
machine). Besides, the schedule and energy consumption
is associated to surrounding environments, for example,
temperature and humidity. Furthermore, big data analytics in social networks is being widely studied [23] as well.
Useful information can be mined from the status posted by
customers to assist smart grid operations.
However, enormous computing and storage resources
are needed to extract useful information efficiently. How
can utility companies achieve it with a reasonable budget? A feasible solution is to introduce cloud computing
into the ICT infrastructure [24]. Cloud computing brings
three major advantages to smart grid. Firstly, there is no
need to invest on the whole infrastructure, only the infrastructure for the private portion of the cloud is deployed
by utility companies. The resources from the public portion of the cloud can be rent at a relatively low price. In
many cases, cloud computing uses a pay-as-you-go pricing model. The maintenance cost is also low because it
only applies to the private portion. Secondly, it is easier
to implement applications in cloud. Public cloud computing has virtually unlimited resources. Therefore, the utility
companies need not worry about upgrading capacity for
large-scale system, which is no doubt a huge concern in
smart grid. The infrastructure in cloud can also be rescaled
according to adaptive requirements. Moreover, because of
the elasticity, feature updates/upgrades can be performed
in a short amount of time without disturbing users to
install major updates or extra packages. Thirdly, it is easier to access cloud service from a variety of smart devices.
Because of that, monitoring and controlling of the grid can
be more flexible. Once the security is provided over the
transmission, cloud service can be accessed from virtually
anywhere with authorization.
3.7. Security requirement of the framework
There are different types of information frequently
transmitted in the proposed ICT framework. General
security requirements are listed in Table I for each type of
information.

Because LANs are established for customers, the security is protected by corresponding wireless protocols.
Because the utility company have control over the private
networks, information exchanged through private networks
is likely well protected. However, the utility company have
no control over Internet or the CCC; therefore, communications between LCCs and the CCC need more security
protection in addition to the default protection provided by
Internet protocol and cloud computing service providers.
Moreover, public cloud service may not fulfill the security requirements from the utility company. Therefore,
we propose to apply identity-based security schemes for
power companies to secure the data transmission in the
aforementioned framework.

3.8. Applications of the proposed security
schemes
Encryption and digital signature: The proposed
security schemes can be applied directly to provide
both confidentiality and non-repudiation. For instance,
pre-processed metering data sent from LCCs to the
CCC is encrypted and signed to provide confidentiality and non-repudiation. Information generated by big
data analytics is also encrypted and signed before being
sent from the CCC to LCCs.
Session key distribution: If symmetric ciphers are
preferred in some applications, the proposed identitybased scheme can be applied to achieve secure session
key distribution.
Signing right delegation from Li to Lj : If Li is subject
to a routine maintenance, it may delegate signing rights
to another LCC (e.g., Lj ). As shown in Figure 3, the
PKG has the authority to delegate signing right from
Li to Lj . Alternatively, Li can delegate signing right
to Lj locally without involving another party for more
efficient operation.
Signing right delegation from Li to a group of LCCs:
The PKG can assign a group of LCCs as a group proxy
to sign for Li , as illustrated in Figure 4. Without loss
of generality, assuming a total number N LCCs are
chosen as a group in the rest of the paper.

Table I. Security requirements.

Metering data
Monitoring data
Control message
Raw energy forecast
Pre-processed data
Price forecast
Energy forecast
Other information

Confidentiality

Data Integrity

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

Non-repudiation

X
X
X
X
X
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Figure 3. Signing right delegation from Li to Lj .

Figure 4. Signing right delegation from Li to a group of local control centers (LCCs).
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4. IDENTITY-BASED SECURITY
SCHEMES
In the ICT framework, each component has a unique ID.
The foundation of ID-based security scheme is public key
cryptography. However, instead of generating keys randomly, ID-based security scheme utilizes the unique ID of
each participant. By doing so, key management might be
more convenient because some of the keys can be computed locally or even ahead of time. Furthermore, privacy
and authentication can still be provided to the participants.
In the proposed ID-based security, we adopt (ID||time)
instead of ID for public key generation, where time is
the expiration time of current session. In the next session,
the entire participants will update corresponding secrets
and parameters accordingly. When a participant leaves the
system domain, secrets bared by this participant need to
be revoked. By adopting ID||time, if the PKG stops issuing secret keys to the left participant, key revocation can
be performed automatically at the beginning of the next
session. New messages will not be disclosed to old keys.
ID-based security scheme has several applications in
the ICT framework. For example, privacy of the messages
(e.g., pre-processed data) sent from LCCs to the CCC
can be protected by ID-based encryption. Authentication
of the messages sent from control centers to customers
(e.g., pricing forecast) can be protected by ID-based digital
signature.

R

chosen master key s  Z
q , a domain secret
g1 = sg 2 G1 . The PKG also chooses three
cryptographic hash functions,
H1 : {0, 1} ! G1 ,
H2 : {0, 1} ! Z
q,

H3 : {0, 1} ! {0, 1}n
The domain public parameters are
˛
˝
params = G1 , G2 , g, q, g1 , H1 , H2 , H3 , n
The public/private keys of the AS are pAS =
H1 (AS||time) and dAS = spAS .
Keygen: For a given string ID 2 {0, 1} and a expiration time stamp time, the algorithm builds a
public/private key pair pID /dID as follows.
 Public key: pID = H1 (ID||time).
 Private key: dID = spID .
Note that time is converted into {0, 1} and
is concatenated to ID in the illustration. Other
processes can be taken for the same purpose,
for example, time can also be XORed to ID.
Signcrypt: To signcrypt a message M, sender A
R

(1) randomly picks r  Zq and sets
U = rg

4.1. Preliminaries
(2) computes h1 = H2 (M||A||U) and sets
The proposed ID-based security scheme is based on bilinear map. Let G1 and G2 be groups of prime order q. Let g
be a generator of G1 . Let eO : G1  G1 ! G2 . We say that
(G1 , G2 ) are bilinear map groups if eO has the properties in
the following:
 Bilinearity: eO (aP, bQ) = eO (P, Q)ab for all P, Q 2 G1
and all a, b 2 Z
q.
 Non-degeneracy: For any P 2 G1 , eO (P, Q) ¤ 1 for all
Q 2 G1 \{O} (indicated as G1 hereafter).
 Computability: There is a polynomial time algorithm
for computing eO (P, Q) for all P, Q 2 G1 .
4.2. Identity-based signcryption
The proposed IBSC scheme comprises five algorithms:
Setup, Keygen, Signcrypt, Decrypt, and Verify. Without loss
of generality, let A (IDA = A) sends message M = {0, 1}n
to B (IDB = B). The detailed IBSC scheme is described in
the following:
Setup: The PKG chooses groups (G1 , G2 ) of prime
order q, a generator g of G1 , a randomly
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

V = dA h1 + rg1
(3) computes pB = H1 (B||time) and h2 =
H2 (A||B), and sets
X = h2 U


(4) computes h3 = H3 X||Oe(rg1 , h2 pB )
and encrypts the message
W = M ˚ h3
˝
˛
(5) finally outputs a 4-tuple U, V, X, W .
˝
˛
Note that in the 4-tuple,  = ˝ U, V ˛ serves as
the digital signature and C = X, W serves as
the cipher text. ˝
˛
Decrypt: Upon receiving  , C , receiver B decrypts M
in the steps as follows.


(1) B computes h03 = H3 X||Oe(X, dB ) ;
0
(2) decrypts M = W ˚ h3 .
5269
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Verify: With M recovered, B continues to verify the
digital signature in the steps as follows.
(1) computes pA = H1 (A||time), and h1 =
H2 (M||A||U);
(2) verifies if eO (g, V) = eO (g1 , pA h1 + U).
This completes the description of the
IBSC scheme. We then verify consistency. To
Decrypt M, it must be h03 = h3 . It can be
verified as follows:
eO (X, dB ) = eO (h2 rg, spB )
= e(rg, pB )sh2

(1)

= e(rg1 , h2 pB )
Therefore,


h03 = H3 X||Oe(X, dB )


= H3 X||Oe(h2 rg, spB )

(1) computes pA = H1 (A||time) and h1 = H1 (M||A||U);
(2) verifies if eO (g, V) = eO (g1 , pA h1 + U).
This completes the description of the IBS scheme. The
consistency is proven by Equation (3).
4.4. Key distribution and symmetrical
cryptography
Although encryption is achieved in the IBSC scheme, some
may still prefer symmetric ciphers (e.g., advanced encryption standard) for data encryption. Because the proposed
identity-based schemes are based on bilinear pairing (over
elliptic curves) with large numbers, they are considerably
slow compared with well-established symmetric ciphers.
Therefore, the IBSC can be modified for session key distribution with symmetric ciphers (e.g., EK ()) for the actual
data encryption.
Modified IBSC: To secure a message M with a session
key K, sender A

Algorithm Verify is consistent because

R

(1) randomly picks r  Zq and sets

eO (g, V) = eO (g, dA h1 + rg1 )
(3)

= eO (g1 , pA h1 + U)
From the illustration, we can see that sender A encrypts
the message with pB so that confidentiality is provided.
Sender A also signs the message with dA so that nonrepudiation is provided. Data integrity is also provided
with hash functions.
4.3. Identity-based signature
As discussed in previous section, not all messages
need encryption. Nonetheless, data integrity and nonrepudiation are still required. Therefore, the IBSC scheme
may be reduced to an identity-based signature scheme. The
IBS scheme comprises of two algorithms, Sign and Verify.
For consistency, let A sends M to B in the illustration as
follows:
Sign: For a given message M, sender A

Verify: At the receiver side, B

(2)

= h3

= eO (g, pA h1 + rg)s
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U = rg
(2) computes h1 = H2 (M||K||A||U) and sets
V = dA h1 + rg1
(3) computes pB = H1 (B||time) and h2 = H2 (A||B),
and sets
X = h2 U


(4) computes h3 = H3 X||Oe(rg1 , h2 pB ) and
encrypts the message
W = K ˚ h3
(5) encrypts M as C = EK (M);
˝
˛
(6) finally outputs a 5-tuple U, V, X, W, C .
Digital signature is provided in the same way that IBSC
does. The consistency of the modified IBSC follows
the original scheme.

R

(1) randomly picks r  Zq and computes
U = rg
(2) computes h1 = H1 (M||A||U) 2 Z
q and sets
V = dA h1 + rg1
˝
˛
(3) finally outputs  = U, V .
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4.5. Single proxy signing right delegation
Certificate distribution: Let cij be the certificate of
signing right delegated by Li to Lj . A simple example of such certificate could be cij = AS||j||tij , where tij
be the expiration time of cij . A certificate can be valid
for one message, or for all messages before expiration
of the certificate. To delegate cij for a message M, the
LCC Li
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˝
˛
(2) finally outputs a 5-tuple c0 = u0 , v0 , u0 , w0 , cij .

R

(1) randomly picks y  Z
q and sets

The delegation c0 is verified by Lj if eO (v0 , w0 ) =
eO (h0 u0 dj , h0 pi + h0 pAS + u0 ). The consistency is shown
in the following:

U = yg
(2) computes h = H1 (M||cij ) and sets

eO (v0 , w0 ) = eO (h0 u0 pj , h0 di + h0 dAS + yg1 )

V = hUpj

= eO (h0 u0 pj , h0 pi + yg)s
=

(3) sets W = hdi + yg1 .
=
Signing
rights
delegation is a 4-tuple c
˝
˛
U, V, W, cij .
Once Lj receives the c , it verifies if eO (V, W) =
eO (hUdj , hpi + U). The consistency is shown in the
following:

(4)

= eO (hUdj , hpi + U)

i

+ h0 p

AS

(6)
+ u0 )

4.6. Group proxy signing right delegation
Group proxy signing right of Li is delegated by the PKG to
a chosen group of LCCs (e.g., Ln for some n).

R

(1) randomly picks yn  Z
q and computes
un = yn g,

Single proxy signature: With certificate cij , Lj is ready
to sign message M on behalf of Li . To do so, Lj

hn = H1 (m||cin ),
vn = hn upn ,

R

(1) randomly picks z  Z
q and computes

wn = hn dAS + yn g1
˛
˝
(2) finally outputs a 5-tuple n = un , vn , wn , cin .

 = zg,
 = H1 (m||w||cij ),
! = w + dj + zg1
(2) finally outputs a 5-tuple ij = {cij , u, w, , !}.
The proxy signature is ij = {cij , u, w, , !} (note
that u, cij , and w are from Li ). A receiver verifies ij by
checking if

Once Ln receives the n , it verifies the certificate by
checking if eO (vn , wn ) = eO (hudj , hpAS + un ).
Partial signature: With n , Ln can generate a partial
signature for message M. To do so, Ln
R

(1) randomly picks zn  Z
q and computes
n = zn g,
n = H1 (m||wn ||cin ),



eO (g, !) = eO g1 , hpi + u + pj + 

!n = wn + n dn + zn g1

The consistency is shown in the following:

(2) finally
outputs ˛ a
˝
cin , un , wn , n , !n .

eO (g, !) = eO (g, w + dj + zg1 )
= eO (g, hpi + yg + pj + )s


= eO g1 , hpi + u + pj + 

j

, h0 p

Certificate distribution: For each Ln , the PKG generates a partial signing right certificate cin and

eO (V, W) = eO (hUpj , hdi + yg1 )
= eO (hUpj , hpi + yg)s

eO (h0 u0 d

5-tuple

n0

=

(5)

Signing right delegation by the PKG: Alternatively,
the PKG is able to distribute a certificate cij to Lj . To
do so, the PKG
R

(1) randomly picks y  Z
q and computes
u0 = yg,

Group signature: After all the proxies have generated
partial signatures, one of the LCCs is chosen as the
gateway (e.g., Lj ). To generate a group signature, Lj
(1) computes
g =

!g =

h0 = H1 (m||cij ),
v0 = hupj ,
w0 = hdi + hdAS + yg1
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N
X
n=1
N
X
n=1
N
X

n ,

!n ,

wn

n=1
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˝
˛
(2) finally outputs g = g , !g , wg , wn &cin 8n .
Upon receiving the group signature g , a receiver
verifies by checking if
N
X
eO (g, !g ) = eO g1 ,
(hn pAS + n pn ) + ug + g

!

n=1

The consistency can be verified such that

eO (g, !g ) = eO g,

= eO g,

N
X
n=1
N
X

!
(wn + n dn + zn g1 )
!
(hdAS + yn g1 + n dn + zn g1 )

n=1
N
X

= eO g1 ,

= eO g1 ,

n=1
N
X

!
(hn pAS + yn g + n pn + zn g)
!
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 Key extraction queries: A produces an identity
ID and receives the private key dID .
 Challenge: After a polynomial number of
queries, A outputs two equal-length plaintexts
M0 and M1 and a public key ID on which it
wishes to be challenged (ID has not appeared in
private key queries). The challenger picks a random bit T 2 {0, 1} and encrypts Mb according
to the IBE scheme.
 More key extraction queries: A issues more key
extraction queries. The challenger responds as
before.
Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess T 0 2 {0, 1}, A
wins the game if T = T 0 .
Security analysis
Lemma 1. Let H1 be a random oracle from {0, 1} to
G1 . An adversary A has  advantage against IBE. Then
there exists an adversary F that has advantage

(hn pAS + n pn ) + ug + g

n=1

5. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED SCHEMES
5.1. Assumptions for security analysis
The security of the IBSC and IBS schemes is based on the
following computational problems [16,17,25]:
Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem: given
P, aP, and bP 2 G1 , to compute abP 2 G1 in
polynomial time.
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) problem: given
P, aP, bP, and cP 2 G1 , to compute eO (P, P)abc 2 G2
in polynomial time.

F 


e(1 + qE )

(7)

Proof. Let T be a random variable following Bernoulli
distribution, that is, T 2 {0, 1} with probability ı of being
0 and probability 1 – ı of being 1.
Setup: the challenger generates system parameters and
R

sends it to F . F picks a random value pID  G1 .
Then A issues H1 queries.
Public key queries on H1 : A queries oracle H1 at IDi ,
F responds that,
 If H1 (IDi ) exists in L1 (which is a list kept by F ),
then returns that stored value.
 If H1 (IDi ) does not exist in L1 , then F randomly
R

Without loss of generality, time stamp time is viewed
as part of the identity ID in the analysis later. For better illustration, the proposed IBSC scheme is separated
into identity-based encryption scheme and identity-based
signature for security analysis. Moreover, all the random
values are picked uniformly unless specified.

choose T 2 {0, 1}, and vi  Z
q and sets

pi = H1 (IDi ) =

vi g, T = 0
vi pID , T = 1

(8)

Security models
Definition 1 ((Semantic security for IBE schemes) [25]).
if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary has a nonnegligible advantage in this game:

˝
˛
F stores IDi , pi , vi , T in L1 .
Challenge: A outputs IDc and two equal-length messages M0 and M1 . F gives the challenger M0 , M1 , the
challengers ˝randomly
picks u 2 {0, 1} and encrypts
˛
Mu ! C = X, W . F runs the response to H1 queries
to
E that H1 (IDc ) = pc . Then, F finds
D find pc such
IDc , pc , vi , T .

(1) The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the system’s parameters and sends them to the
adversary.
(2) The adversary A performs a series of queries:

 If T = 0, then F aborts.
0
 DIf T = 1,
E then we have pc = vi pID . Set C =
v–1
i X, W . Because

5.2. Identity-based encryption security

5272

Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

F. Ye, Y. Qian and R. Q. Hu

Secured big data and cloud ICT framework in smart grid system

Let EH be the event that A issues H3 queries for
H3 (Y||D), then from [25] we know that Pr[EH ]  
.
and thus B  q2
H

–1
eO (v–1
i X, dc ) = eO (X, vi spc )

= eO (X, v–1
i svi pID )

3

= eO (X, dID )
therefore, C0 is IBE of Mu under IDc , and decryption
of C0 using dc is the same as decryption of C using dID .
Guess: F outputs a guess u0 .
If F does not abort during the process, then |Pr[u =
u0 ] – 1/2|  , where the probability is over the random
bits used by A, F and the challenger. Let
 E1 be the event that F aborts in private key
queries.
 E2 be the event that F aborts in challenge stage.

Theorem 1. Suppose H1 and H3 are random oracles,
A has advantage  against IBE within running time t. A
also makes qE private key extraction queries and qH3 H3
queries. Then there exists polynomial algorithm F that
solves the BDH problem with advantage
0 

2
e(1 + qE )qH3

(12)

within a time t0 < t + (qH1 + qE + qH3 )tm where tm is the
time to compute a scalar multiplication in G1 .

Then we have the probability of not aborting is
Theorem 1 follows Lemmas 1 and 2 directly.
Pr(:E1 ^ :E2 ) = Pr(:E1 )Pr(:E2 ) =

ı qE (1 – ı)

(9)

The maximum probability is achieved at ıopt =
which implies that

qE
qE +1 ,

Pr(:E1 ^ :E2 ) = ı qE (1 – ı) 

1
e(1 + qE )

(10)

Thus, we can conclude that F has an advantage

.
F  e(1+q
E)
Lemma 2. Let H3 be a random oracle from Z
q to
{0, 1}n . Then there is an algorithm F that solves the BDH
problem with advantage
2
B 
qH3

(11)

Proof. Given (g, P1 , P2 , P3 ) = (g, ag, bg, cg), F sets g1 =
P1 and pID = P2 . A then issues H3 queries for hi .
H queries: Suppose that F keeps a list L2 for
˝ 3
˛
hi , H3 (hi ) . If H3 (hi ) exists in L2 , return that value.
R

Otherwise, F randomly picks v  {0, 1}n and sets
Hi (hi ) = v.
Challenge: A outputs M0 and M1 . F randomly picks
˝
˛
R
Y  {0, 1}n and defines C = P3 , Y . F gives C to A.
Note that by definition, the decryption is
Y ˚ H3 (Y||Oe(Y, dID )) = Y ˚ H3 (Y||D)
where D = eO (Y, dID ).
R

Guess: A outputs u0  {0, 1}. F randomly picks
˛ R
˝
hj , H3 (hj )  L2 and outputs hj . Note that with Y and
hj , D can be computed because Y||hj = D, where D is
the solution to the BDH problem.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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5.3. Identity-based signature security
Security models
Definition 2 ((Strongly existentially unforgeable identity-based signature scheme under chosen-message attacks)
[16]). If no probabilistic polynomial time adversary has
a non-negligible advantage in this game:
(1) The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the system’s parameters and sends them to the
adversary.
(2) The adversary A performs a series of queries:
 Key extraction queries: A produces an identity
IDi and receives the private key di .
 Signature queries: A produces a message M
and an identity IDi and receives a signature
on M that was generated by the signature oracle using the private key corresponding to the
identity IDi (i.e., di ).
 After a polynomial number of queries, A produces a tuple (ID, M,  ) made of an identity
ID, whose corresponding private key was never
asked during stage 2, and a message signature
pair (M,  ) such that  was not returned by
the signature oracle on the input (M, ID) during
stage 2 for the identity ID.
A wins the game if the forged signature can be verified when the verification algorithms run on the tuple
(ID, M,  ). The forger’s advantage is defined to be its probability of producing a forgery taken over the number of
coin-flipping of the challenger and A.

Security analysis
Theorem 2. Let H1 and H2 be random oracles, A has
advantage  against IBS in running time t. A also makes
5273
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qE private key extraction queries, qH2 H2 queries, and qS
signature queries. Then there is an algorithm F that solves
the CDH problem with advantage
C 

 – qS (qH2 + qS )/q
e(qE + 1)

(13)

within running time t0 < t + (qH1 + qE + qH2 + 2qS )tm
+ (qS + 1)tmm , where tm is the running time for a scalar
multiplication in G1 and tmm is the running time for a
multi-exponentiation in G1 .
Proof. Let P1 = ag and P2 = bg be the input of the CDH
problem. Given (P1 , P2 ). First, F initializes g1 = P1 as
the domain secret. From the perspective of the adversary,
the distribution of g1 secret is identical to the real one (i.e.,
g1 = sg). Let T be a random variable following Bernoulli
distribution, that is, T 2 {0, 1} with probability ı of being
0 and probability 1 – ı of being 1. Then, F issues a series
of queries as stated in the following:

F. Ye, Y. Qian and R. Q. Hu

Define H2 (hi ) = (ui P2 )–1 (i g – Ui ) 2 Z
q . The pair
˝
˛
i = Ui , Vi appears as a valid signature.
˝
i =

˛
Ui , Vi , H2 (hi ) not defined in L2 ,
Abort, H2 (hi ) defined in L2

(5) Signature forgery: Given a message M and an iden˝
˛
tity ID, A forges a signature U, V . F recovers
(ID, u, T)

eO (g, V) = eO (g1 , pID hID + U)
With hID = v, pID = uP2 , where u and v are known,
then F also finds that
eO (g, V) = eO (g1 , pID h1 + U)

R

an identity IDi . F first picks a random number ui 
Z
q and decides the public key based on the outcome
of T, such that
ui P2 , T = 1,
ui g, T = 0

L1

If T = 0 then abort. Otherwise (i.e., T = 1), the
list L2 must contain an entry (ID, M, U, v) with overwhelming probability. Because H2 (hID ) has been
defined as v, if A succeeds in the game then F knows
that

(1) H1 queries: Suppose the adversary issues a query for



(17)

= eO (g1 , pID hID )Oe(g1 , U)
= eO (P1 , uP2 v)Oe(P1 , U)
) eO (g, V – vP1 ) = eO (P1 , vuP2 )

(14)

And (vu)–1 (V – vP1 ) is the solution to the CDH
instance (P1 , P2 ).

F then keeps (IDi , ui , T) in list L1 .
(2) Private key queries: For IDi , F recovers ui and T
from L1 , such that

From Lemma 1, we know that the probability of F not
aborting in the process of key extraction query is at least
1/e(qE + 1). Moreover, F aborts in the process of signature
queries is at most qS (qH2 + qS )/q because of conflict on H2 ,
where q is the size of G1 . Overall, F has an advantage at

pi =

(IDi , ui , T)

L1

least  0 

And the private key of IDi is determined as

di =

Abort, T = 1,
ui P1 , T = 0

(15)

T = 1 indicates that no answer to the query. When
T = 0, note that di = api follows the distribution of
real secret key.
(3) H2 queries: Assuming that F keeps a list L2
that stores any previously defined H2 (hi ). Given
(IDi , M, Ui ), F first checks whether H2 (hi ) has been
defined (e.g., Hi ). If so, the defined value will be
R

returned. Otherwise, F randomly picks vi  Z
q,
and determine H2 (hi ) as,

H2 (hi ) =

vi , not defined in L2 ,
Hi , already defined in L2

6. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF
THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
6.1. Analysis
Performance of the proposed schemes is based on the
number of operations and the efficiency of each type of
operations. Table II lists the number of operations of each
algorithm. Among them, mul indicates standard multiplication in G1 . Because the addition in G1 and XOR

(16)

(4) Signature queries: A randomly chooses i  Z
q
and i  Z
q . Then set Ui = i g and Vi = i g1 .
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That completes the proof.

Table II. Computation complexity.

R

R

–qS (qH2 +qS )/q
.
e(qE +1)

Signcrypt
Decrypt
Sign
Verify

# of eO

# of mul

# of H1

# of H2

# of H3

1
1
0
3

5
0
3
1

1
0
1
1

2
0
0
1

1
1
0
0
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are simple and efficient operations, they are not listed in
the table.
Hash functions can be computed efficiently in general.
In practice, H2 and H3 are easy to find. However, it is hard
to build H1 : {0, 1} ! G1 . In the analysis, we relax H1
into two steps.
(1) H1 : {0, 1} ! I  {0, 1} ;
(2) H10 : I ! G1
In step 1, I is a finite set, H10 is an encoding function
that is computable. Note that after the relaxation, the public key for a give ID and time is pID = H10 (H1 (ID||time)). In
the proposed IBSC scheme, public keys can be computed
at the beginning of each session and cached for the entire
session. Therefore, the relaxation of H1 does not introduce more computation cost in reality. Because of that,
performance of the IBSC and IBS schemes will be considered efficient if bilinear pairing eO and multiplication in G1
can be computed efficiently. Because the Weil pairing can
be performed efficiently using Miller’s algorithm [26], the
bilinear map eO can be performed efficiently as well.
To analyze the performance of the IBSC scheme, we
apply two bilinear pairing functions, that is, modified Weil
pairing and Tate pairing over supersingular elliptic curve
E : {y2 = x3 + 1|x, y 2 Fp }. We first construct G1 . Let p be
a prime number s.t. p  2 mod 3 and p = aq – 1 for some
prime q and positive integer a. Then G1 is the subgroup
of order q of F 2 . CCH problem is hard in the group G1
p
[25,27]. However, it is worth mentioning that decisional
Diffie–Hellman problem is an easy one for bilinear map eO .
This is because with given P, aP, bP, cP 2 G1 , 8a, b, c 2
Z
q , we can easily check if c  ab mod q by comparing
eO (aP, bP) with eO (P, cP).
The Weil pairing e has the properties of bilinearity and
computability; however, it does not have non-degeneracy.
Therefore, we adopt a modified Weil pairing eO : G1 
G1 ! G2 s.t. eO (P, Q) = e(P, (Q)), where  is an automorphism on the group of points of supersingular elliptic
curve E : {y2 = x3 + 1|x, y 2 Fp }, that is, (x, y) = (x, y),
where  is a primitive cube root of unity in Fp . Thus,
y2 = (x)3 + 1 =  3 x3 + 1 = x3 + 1 ) (P1 ) + (P2 ) =
(P1 +P2 ), 8P1 , P2 2 G1 . The bilinear map eO is calculated
as a Weil pairing with an additional standard multiplication
on the curve E. According to [25], eO is believed to satisfy
the BDH problem. However, computing discrete logarithm
in Fp is sufficient for computing discrete logarithm in G1 .
Therefore, in order to make it sufficiently hard in practice,
q needs to be at least 512-bit long.

difference in computational time and the added encoding
function H10 is more efficient than H1 , the hash functions
are excluded from the performance analysis.
First, we evaluate the computational time for bilinear
pairing eO . Two sets of evaluation are given, that is, for
q = 256 bits and q = 385 bits. Each evaluation is the average value from 10 000 calculations. With q = 256 bits,
one eO takes about 7.44 ms. With q = 385 bits, one eO takes
about 13.25 ms. We then evaluate the computational time
of standard multiplication over G1 (i.e., kp P 2 G1 ). The
computational time of kp P 2 G1 mainly depends on the
size of kp (assuming q = 256 bits). The computational time
of each evaluation is averaged from 10 000 calculations.
With kp = 128/256/512 bits, a standard multiplication
operation takes about 3.25/6.43/12.29 ms. Note that in the
proposed IBSC, kp is the output of some hash functions,
therefore, kp usually is 256 bits or 512 bits, where the computation is efficient. The evaluation results are summarized
in Table III.
Based on the evaluations we have for each operation,
we then show the total operational time for each algorithm.
In practice, public keys are computed once and cached
for the entire session. Computational time of each algorithm is listed in Table IV. It is shown that the proposed
IBSC performs efficiently for delay tolerable and even near
real-time data transmission, for example, metering data
transmission. However, for real-time monitoring data, for
example, PMU data, identity-based schemes alone may
not be a good solution. Without sufficient computational
resources, faster security protocols and schemes are recommended, for instance, traditional symmetric ciphers. The
proposed IBSC can be applied for initial authentication and
key distribution of the chosen symmetric ciphers.
Table III. Computational time for each operation.
Bilinear pairing eO
q = 256 bits
q = 385 bits
7.44 ms
13.25 ms
Standard multiplication
kp = 256 bits
kp = 512 bits
6.43 ms
12.29 ms

Table IV. Computational time of each algorithm.

Signcrypt
Decrypt
Sign
Verify

6.2. Numerical results
We evaluate the proposed identity-based schemes with
modified Weil pairing eO using Mathematica 10.0 with a
computer equipped with an Intel Core i5-2400 @ 3.1 GHz
and 12 GB RAM. We first show the computational cost of
each operation. Because H1 , H2 , and H3 do not have much
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:5262–5277 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Signcrypt
Decrypt
Sign
Verify

q = 256 bits
kp = 256 bits

q = 256 bits
kp = 512 bits

39.59 ms
7.44 ms
19.29 ms
28.75 ms

68.89 ms
7.44 ms
36.87 ms
34.61 ms

q = 385 bits
q = 256 bits

q = 385 bits
q = 512 bits

45.4 ms
13.25 ms
19.29 ms
46.18 ms

74.7 ms
13.25 ms
36.87 ms
52.04 ms
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7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a big data-driven, cloud-based
ICT framework for smart grid communication infrastructure. Taking into consideration the security requirements
of each message, we proposed an ID-based signcryption
security scheme to secure the transmissions in the ICT
framework. The proposed IBSC scheme performs simultaneously the functions of encryption and digital signature.
Therefore, confidentiality, non-repudiation as well as data
integrity are provided. The proposed IBSC scheme was
also reduced to an ID-based digital signature scheme. To
further enhance the computational performance, symmetric ciphers are introduced to the IBSC. In addition, signing
right delegation from one LCC to another (or a few)
LCC is achieved by identity-based schemes. The security
of the proposed IBSC is studied. The numerical results
showed that the proposed IBSC scheme is able to perform
efficiently with security guarantee in the CPS of smart
grid. In the future, we will focus on the researches of
big data analytics in implementing the ICT framework in
smart grid.
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